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Abstract: This paper shows that exchange rates respond to only the surprise component of 
an actual US monetary policy change and that failure to disentangle the surprise component from 
the actual monetary policy change can lead to an underestimation of the impact of monetary 
policy, or even to a false acceptance of the hypothesis that monetary policy has no impact on 
exchange rates. This finding implies that there is a need for reexamining the empirical analyses 
of asset price responses to macro news that do not isolate the unexpected component of news 
from the expected element. In addition, we add to the debate on how quickly exchange rates 
respond to news by showing that the exchange rates under study absorb monetary policy 
surprises within the same day as the news are announced. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether exchange rates respond to only the surprise component of actual 
monetary policy changes and whether failure to disentangle the surprise component from the monetary 
policy news announcement leads to an underestimation of the impact of the news, or even to a false 
acceptance of the hypothesis that the news has no impact on exchange rates. In addition, we examine 
whether the exchange rate price adjustment associated with the monetary policy change is instantaneous 
or delayed. 
Recent empirical contributions by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), Faust, Rogers, 
Swanson and Wright (2003), Evans and Lyons (2005) and Simpson, Ramchander and Chaudry (2005)  
find that exchange rates react to monetary policy surprises, i.e. to the unexpected component of a change 
in the monetary policy stance.1 This finding is in line with the predictions of the standard asset pricing 
models of exchange rate determination where exchange rates are viewed as forward-looking asset-prices.2
A common characteristic of all these studies, however, is that they focus their analysis of news 
effects on only one type of variable, namely the surprise component of a news announcement.3 Rather 
than focusing on only the surprise component of news which, by construction, is a simple linear function 
of the actual announcement and the expected component, our analysis makes use of the three variables 
(the surprise component, the expected component, and the actual announcement) separately.4
In doing so we are able to address not only whether exchange rates respond to the surprise 
component of news but also, at the same time, whether exchange rates respond to the expected component 
                                                 
1 These papers as well as ours are related to an older literature on the effectiveness of anticipated versus 
unanticipated monetary policy on output and unemployment. While the recent literature employs survey data or 
market-based measures of expectations for distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy 
innovations, the older literature relies on output from econometric models of these policy innovations. Important 
older contributions include Barro (1977), Barro and Hercowitz (1980) and Mishkin (1982). 
2 Engel and West (2005) revisit the “asset-market” approach to exchange rate determination and conclude that 
“exchange rates and fundamentals are linked in a way that is broadly consistent with asset pricing models of the 
exchange rate”. 
3 Recent papers by Bernanke and Kuttner (2004), Craine and Martin (2003) and Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) 
follow the same approach in regards to using only the surprise element (the difference between announcement and 
expectation) of news as the explanatory variable when measuring the response of the stock market to monetary 
policy changes and other macroeconomic news.  
4 We are only investigating the impact of US monetary policy news and, therefore, we do not rescale our news 
variables by their respective standard deviations. 
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of news. In other words, unlike the aforementioned studies we are able to address whether exchange rates 
respond to only the surprise component of news. In addition, the inclusion of all three news variables in 
our analysis makes it possible to assess the importance of focusing on the surprise component of news by 
comparing the exchange rate response to news when news are measured properly (i.e. when separating 
the surprise component from the actual announcement) to the exchange rate response to news when news 
are measured improperly (i.e. when measuring news as simply the news announcement itself).  This 
facilitates a comparison of our findings to the findings of studies that do not distinguish between 
announcement and surprise component. 
 Both the predictions of standard asset pricing theory and the survey responses from currency 
traders reported in Cheung and Chinn (2001) suggest that the effects from macro news announcements 
are quickly absorbed in prices. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the empirical literature on exchange 
rates and macro news in regards to how fast the absorption process really is. For example, Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) find that exchange rates generally respond within five minutes of the 
news announcement (characterized by a jump immediately following the announcement and little 
movement thereafter) while Faust and Rogers (2003) and Faust, Rogers, Swanson and Wright (2003) in 
the context of identified (recursively or not) VAR models show confidence intervals consistent with 
exchange rate responses occurring anywhere from instantaneously to five years after the news 
announcement. Similarly, Evans and Lyons (2005) find delayed exchange rate responses several days 
after the news occurred while Simpson, Ramchander and Chaudry (2005) show that exchange rates 
respond to news within the same day as the news are announced. Our analysis also adds to the literature 
on how quickly exchange rates respond to monetary policy news. 
We focus our investigation on the 42 US monetary policy changes that occurred during the 1989 
to 2000 time-period and we follow Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Rogers, Swanson and Wright (2003) and 
use data on Fed funds futures for isolating the surprise component of each of these actual policy 
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changes.5, 6 In particular, we use the decomposition of the actual change into an expected and a surprise 
(unexpected) component, as displayed in Kuttner (2001, p. 532). Furthermore, we use an event study 
approach and incorporate several control variables that capture the surprise element of US 
macroeconomic news and policy developments. The period under study is characterized as a floating 
exchange rate regime, thus there is no reason to believe that the Fed changes US monetary policy in 
response to same-day or short-term exchange rate movements. Based on this institutional factor, it seems 
reasonable to assume that exchange rates are reacting to monetary policy changes, rather than the reverse. 
Consistent with standard asset pricing theory applied to exchange rates we find that the expected 
component of a monetary policy change has no impact on the exchange rate while the unexpected 
component of a tightening (loosening) of US monetary policy is associated with a same-day appreciation 
(depreciation) of the USD.  By comparing the exchange rate response to news with news decomposed 
into a surprise and an expected component, to the exchange rate response to news with news measured 
simply by the actual announcement itself (which is the sum of the surprise and the expected component) 
we show how failure to disentangle the surprise component from the actual monetary policy change can 
lead to an underestimation of the impact of monetary policy or even to a false acceptance of the 
hypothesis that monetary policy has no impact on exchange rates.  
This is an important result as it implies the need for reexamining past empirical work of asset 
price responses to macro news whenever such work merely equate macro announcement with macro 
innovation without explicitly taking into account the importance of expectations. Specifically, this result 
may suggest a possible explanation for why our findings appear at odds with the findings presented in two 
well-known studies by, respectively, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Lewis (1995). These studies do 
                                                 
5 Since the market for Fed funds futures opened in 1988, empirical studies have found the Fed funds futures contract 
an extremely useful proxy for market expectations of future monetary policy (see Carlson, McIntire and Thomson, 
1995, and Krueger and Kuttner, 1996, for early contributions, as well as Sack, 2002, and Sack, Swanson and 
Gurkaynak, 2002 and others). 
6 The contributions by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), Evans and Lyons (2005) and Simpson, 
Ramchander and Chaudry (2005) use survey data instead of market based measures for capturing expectations and, 
in turn, extracting the surprise component of news. 
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not distinguish between news announcement and surprise component and they do not find evidence in 
support of an immediate exchange rate response to monetary policy changes. 
Adding to the debate on how quickly exchange rates respond to news, we find an absence of 
delayed effects which strongly suggests that the exchange rates under study absorb monetary policy 
surprises quickly and within the same day as the news are announced. Although our study employs 
separate measures of the surprise, the expected component, and the news announcement itself and, 
furthermore, we use a market based measure of expectations and thus avoid relying on survey data, our 
findings in regards to the speed of the absorption of news are, nevertheless, consistent with the findings 
presented in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Simpson, Ramchander and Chaudry 
(2005). However, our evidence in favor of a quick absorption process is at odds with the findings of 
Evans and Lyons (2005). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the data and the Fed 
funds futures market. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results as well as several robustness 
checks. Section 4 further discusses our results in light of other contributions and concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We focus our analysis on the 42 US monetary policy changes that occurred during the 1989 to 2000 time-
period and use Kuttner’s decomposition (Kuttner 2001) to isolate the surprise component of each of these 
actual policy changes. Kuttner (2001) measures surprises associated with an actual monetary policy (i.e. 
Fed funds target rate) change as the difference between the actual announcement and expectations, the 
latter extracted from Fed funds futures data. Specifically, he uses daily spot-month Fed funds futures 
market data for disentangling expected from unexpected changes. He argues that his method for 
extracting the unexpected element of a target rate change generally “delivers a nearly pure measure of the 
one-day surprise target change” (Kuttner, 2001, p. 529). 
Fed funds futures have been trading at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) since October 1988. 
Futures contracts with maturities of one through 24 months are listed, along with a current-month (spot-
 5
month) contract. By construction of the contracts, Fed funds futures rates implicitly embody predictions 
of the monthly average of the daily Fed funds rate for a future calendar month. For example, when the 
price of the one-month ahead contract changes on any given day in, say, January, this implies that market 
expectations of the average price of the Fed funds rate over the month of February has changed. Early 
studies by Carlson, McIntire and Thomson (1995) and Krueger and Kuttner (1996) show that Fed funds 
futures rates provide efficient and unbiased predictors of future funds rate movements at short horizons. 
Recent papers by Chernenko, Schwartz and Wright (2004) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find a 3 
basis point premium at one month horizons and a 6 basis point premium at two month horizons, 
illustrating that the longer the horizon the less useful a predictor is the Fed funds futures contract.  
As pointed out by Kuttner (2001), there are two technical issues involved in using the Fed funds 
futures data for measuring expectations of future monetary policy. First, the Fed funds futures settlement 
price is calculated as an average of the relevant month’s Fed funds rate. Second, the Fed funds future is 
not based on the actual policy instrument, the targeted Fed funds rate, but on the effective market rate. 
Kuttner (2001) carefully addresses these issues and computes a policy surprise measure based on the one-
day change in the spot-month future rate, utilizing the fact that the day-t futures rate embodies the 
expected change on (or after) date t+1. If the target rate change occurs as expected, the spot rate will 
remain unchanged, while a deviation from the expected rate will cause the futures rate to change (in 
proportion to the remaining number of days affected by the unexpected change). For all but the first day 
of the month, he computes the one-day surprise for date t as )( 1,, −−− tsts fftm
m
, where m is the number 
of days in the month and is the spot-month futures rate on day t of month s. For the first day of the 
month, the one-month futures rate from the last day of the previous month replaces the term .  
tsf ,
1, −tsf
The 42 monetary policy change events and the decomposition of the actual change into the 
respective expected and unexpected components, respectively, are displayed in Kuttner (2001, p. 532). 
 6
The exact timing of the US monetary policy changes is an important issue. Until 1994, the Fed 
did not announce but signaled its decision to change the target rate through open market operations 
undertaken before noon (from 11.30 to 11.35 am) Eastern time. Starting in 1994, the Fed adopted a 
routine of announcing target rate changes and from 1995 onwards it did so at 2.15 pm Eastern time.7 
Since the announcement routine has changed during our sample period, no exchange rate quote time-
stamp is ideal for the entire period under study. Our baseline analysis reports the results from models 
using noon Eastern time exchange rate quotes while the robustness analysis described in section 3.6 uses 
3 pm Eastern time quotes as well as a mix of quotes. Accordingly, our analysis incorporates two separate 
foreign exchange market data-sets. The first consists of daily spot prices for the DEM/USD, JPY/USD 
and GBP/USD exchange rates obtained from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service and recorded at noon 
Pacific time (3 pm Eastern time). The second consists of daily spot prices for the same three exchange 
rates obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and recorded at noon Eastern time. 
We control for macroeconomic news surprises coinciding with US monetary policy changes. We 
measure surprises as the difference between official announcements regarding CPI, PPI, industrial 
production, the unemployment rate and the trade balance, and results of surveys of expectations of these 
announcements conducted by Money Market Services and Bloomberg during the days preceding the 
announcements. The official value of these news variables is announced once a month, or at a lower 
frequency. Our news variables capture the associated surprise element on announcement dates, thus these 
variables are non-zero only on announcement dates and only when the announcement differs from market 
expectations. 
Official foreign exchange intervention data and foreign interest rate data are obtained directly 
from the central banks relevant for this study. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
 
 
                                                 
7 For additional details on the timing of Fed announcements, see Kuttner (2001) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold 
and Vega (2003). 
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3. Exchange Rate Responses to Actual Monetary Policy Changes 
When focusing on exchange rate responses to actual monetary policy changes, the asset-pricing approach 
to exchange rate determination suggests that an exchange rate should react to only the surprise component 
of such monetary policy news and it should do so “instantaneously”.8
We formally test whether only the surprise element of a monetary policy change is systematically 
associated with exchange rate responses by incorporating the Kuttner-decomposition of actual monetary 
policy changes into an expected and an unexpected (surprise) component. Using an event study approach 
in the tradition of Cook and Hahn (1989), we regress the change in the (log of the) spot exchange rate on 
the expected and the unexpected component of the target rate change: 
 
(1) tt
u
t
e
tt CZrrs εββα ++++=∆ ~~ 21  
 
where  is the first-difference in the log of the daily spot exchange rate and ts∆ etr~ ( utr~ ) is the expected 
(unexpected) target rate change in percentage points, and C is the coefficient vector associated with the 
control variables contained in Zt.  
The control variable matrix Zt contains the unexpected component of macroeconomic news on 
days when an official macroeconomic announcement coincides with a monetary policy change. 
Specifically, we control for the types of macroeconomic news that Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and, 
more recently, Galati, Melick and Micu (2005) have found to impact exchange rates. We do so by 
incorporating several variables that capture the surprise element of US macroeconomic news and policy 
developments regarding CPI (CPI-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), industrial production (IP-UNEXP), the 
unemployment rate (UNEM-UNEXP) and the trade balance (TRDE-UNEXP).9
                                                 
8 See Engel and West (2005) for a recent discussion of the asset-market approach to exchange rate determination. 
9 Since central bank foreign exchange intervention conducted by central banks may impact day-to-day changes in 
the spot exchange rates as well, we also control for the effects of such actions by either the Fed or the foreign central 
bank. Similarly, we control for actual monetary policy changes by foreign central banks. However, while we are 
able to capture the surprise element of the control variables contained in Zt we do not have corresponding measures 
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Clearly, if the Fed had been following a fixed or managed float exchange rate policy from 1989 
onwards, US monetary policy changes could have been systematically affected by same-day exchange 
rate changes. However, as pointed out by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Kim and Roubini (2000), 
the period under study is characterized as a floating exchange rate regime, thus there is no reason to 
believe that the Fed changes US monetary policy in response to same-day or short-term exchange rate 
movements. Based on this institutional factor, therefore, simultaneous equation bias (endogeneity) should 
not be present in our regression models.10
In order to assess the importance of disentangling the surprise component from the actual 
monetary policy change we estimate a regression model of the exchange rate response to the monetary 
policy change without using the Kuttner-decomposition:  
 
(2) tt
a
tt CZrs εβα +++=∆ )~(1  
 
where atr~ (= 
e
tr~ + 
u
tr~ ) is the actual monetary policy change in percentage points. Consistent with Cook 
and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner (2001) we estimate the regression models described by equations 1) and 2) 
using standard OLS estimation techniques. 
 In order to test whether exchange rate markets absorb monetary policy news quickly or whether 
the absorption process stretches over or takes place after several days we estimate regression models 
characterized by the following equation: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the surprise element of central bank intervention or foreign monetary policy changes. Therefore, we address the 
issue of interventions and foreign monetary policy changes in the robustness section while our baseline models 
described in this section incorporate only the control variables that are based on expectations and capture surprises. 
10 In the context of a time-series analysis of exchange rate responses to day-to-day changes in monetary policy 
expectations in-between actual monetary policy changes, Fatum and Scholnick (forthcoming) formally test for 
simultaneity bias by conducting a standard Hausman test for endogeneity of regressors (see Hausmann 1978 and 
1983). They strongly accept the null hypothesis of no simultaneity bias for the DEM/USD, the JPY/USD and the 
GBP/USD exchange rates. Although the focus and the context of their analysis are very different from what we 
investigate in this paper, their acceptance of the no simultaneity bias hypothesis also implies that the estimations 
presented in this paper are free of simultaneity bias. 
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(3) tkt
u
t
e
tkt CZrbrbas ε++++=∆ ++ ~~ 21 , k=0,…60. 
 
where  is the first-difference in the log of the spot exchange rate k-periods ahead and Zkts +∆ t+k contains 
the control variables k-periods ahead. Since our analysis uses an event study approach instead of time-
series techniques, testing for delayed effects by lagging the exogenous monetary policy variable is not 
meaningful. Therefore, leads of the independent variable and the associated news control variables rather 
than lags of the monetary policy variables are used for capturing any delayed exchange rate responses to 
the monetary policy changes. 
We estimate the regression models described by equation 3) using standard OLS with Newey-
West covariances (see Newey and West, 1987) in order to take into account the possibility of 
autocorrelation in the control variables. 
The estimations cover up to 60 leads of the independent variable (12 business weeks, ensuring 
that we capture any delayed effects in-between FOMC dates). For the sake of exposition, we only display 
a summary of each of the estimations using 0 through 15 leads (three business weeks), respectively, for 
each of the three exchange rate variables. 
A quick absorption process would be consistent with monetary policy surprises being 
systematically related to same-day changes in exchange rates (i.e.  should be significant only when 
k=0) while the “current” monetary policy surprises should be orthogonal to “future” exchange rates (i.e. 
 for  should all be insignificant). 
1b
1b 60,...,1=k
 
3.2 The DEM/USD Exchange Rate 
The first two columns of Table 2 show the estimation results from regressing same-day changes in the 
DEM/USD exchange rate on the expected and the unexpected components of the Fed funds target rate 
changes, as described in equation (1). The first column shows the results when including all the news 
control variables while the second column shows the results when including only the significant news 
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control variables. For both models the  coefficient is insignificant while the  coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 99 percent level, suggesting that the expected component of a monetary policy 
change has no impact on the exchange rate while the unexpected component of a tightening (loosening) of 
US monetary policy is associated with an immediate appreciation (depreciation) of the USD vis-à-vis the 
DEM.  The coefficient estimates imply that an unexpected one percentage point (one hundred basis 
points) change in the target rate is associated with a 2.7 percent same-day change in the exchange rate. 
Or, equivalently, an unexpected 25 basis point change in the target rate is associated with a 0.675 percent 
same-day change in the exchange rate.  
1b 2b
The last two columns of Table 2 show the estimation results from regressing same-day changes in 
the DEM/USD exchange rate on the actual change in the Fed funds target rate (i.e. the sum of the 
expected and the unexpected components), as described in equation (2). Again, the first of these two 
columns shows the results when including all the news control variables while the second column shows 
the results without any news control variables included as none of these appear to be significant.  
None of the two models show any significant effects of a monetary policy change when the 
Kuttner-decomposition is not used, i.e. when the unexpected component is “hidden” in the actual change.  
This finding shows that assessing the impact of monetary policy changes on exchange rates 
without taking into account expectations in order to isolate the surprise component would lead to a wrong 
conclusion, namely that monetary policy changes do not matter for exchange rates. We see this as an 
important result because it highlights the necessity of focusing on the surprise component of news rather 
than on the actual news (i.e. the sum of the surprise and the expected component) itself. 
Turning to the delayed effects and the issue of how quickly the exchange rate absorbs monetary 
policy news, Table 3 shows the coefficient estimate associated with the unexpected component of the Fed 
funds target rate changes for each of the first 15 lead-models described in equation (3) and, in order to 
facilitate an easy comparison between same-day and delayed effects, repeats the same-day coefficient also 
shown in the second column of Table 2. In other words, each row of Table 3 is associated with a separate 
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regression model, and each row shows the coefficient estimate (and standard error) for only the surprise 
component of an actual monetary policy change regardless of whether or not any of the news control 
variables are significant and included in the regression.11
 Whereas the same-day effect is highly significant, as previously discussed, the table shows that 
none of the lead models are associated with significant effects of the unexpected component of a 
monetary policy change. This complete absence of delayed effects implies that the DEM/USD response to 
a monetary policy surprise takes place on the same day as the monetary policy change occurs and, 
therefore, strongly suggests that the DEM/USD exchange rate market absorbs news quickly. 
 
3.3 The JPY/USD Exchange Rate 
The results from regressing same-day changes in the JPY/USD exchange rate on the expected and the 
unexpected components of the Fed funds target rate changes are displayed in the first two columns of 
Table 4. The last two columns of Table 4 show the results from the regression models using the actual 
change in the Federal Funds target rate as the focal explanatory variable. The results are very similar to 
those based on the DEM/USD exchange rate. 
 Focusing on the model using the Kuttner-decomposition and only including significant news 
control variables, the results (displayed in the second column of Table 4) show an insignificant estimate 
of the  coefficient and a positive and (this time only marginally) significant   coefficient, thus once 
again indicating that an unexpected tightening (loosening) of US monetary policy is associated with a 
same-day depreciation (appreciation) of the foreign currency. The magnitude of the estimated  
coefficient suggests that a one percentage point (one hundred basis points) change in the target rate 
triggers a 1.26 percent same-day change in the exchange rate.  
1b 2b
2b
                                                 
11 A high R2 statistic and a highly significant F-statistic are, in the absence of a significant coefficient associated 
with the surprise component of the monetary policy change, due to the inclusion of one or more significant news 
control variables. 
 12
As before, none of the regression models using the sum of the expected and the unexpected 
components as a single explanatory variable display any significant effects of a monetary policy change. 
Again, this illustrates the importance of extracting the unexpected component from the actual change in 
order to avoid arriving at wrong conclusions. 
 The relevant lead model results for the JPY/USD are summarized in Table 5. With the exception 
of a marginally significant coefficient estimate for the k=14 lead model, the table shows that none of the 
lead models are associated with significant effects of the unexpected component of a monetary policy 
change. The analysis, therefore, suggests that the JPY/USD exchange rate market absorbs news quickly. 
 
3.4 The GBP/USD Exchange Rate 
The results of the analysis of the GBP/USD exchange rate responses are very similar to those based on the 
other two exchange rates in our sample and the key findings are repeated. Tables 6 and 7 display these 
findings. 
 The first two columns of Table 6 show that for both model specifications the  coefficient is 
insignificant while the  coefficient is again positive and significant (at the 95 percent level). The 
coefficient estimates imply that an unexpected one percentage point (one hundred basis points) change in 
the target rate is associated with a 2.0 – 2.18 percent same-day change in the exchange rate (or an 
unexpected 25 basis point change in the target rate is associated with a 0.5 percent same-day change in 
the exchange rate).  
1b
2b
 The last two columns show, interestingly, that even without isolating the unexpected component 
from the actual monetary policy change the regression analysis suggests that monetary policy changes 
trigger a same-day exchange rate response. More interesting, however, is it to compare the magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates associated with the actual change to the magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
associated with the unexpected or surprise component of the change. The coefficient estimates stemming 
from the model focusing on the announced policy change without isolating the surprise would imply that 
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a one percentage point (one hundred basis points) change in the target rate is associated with a 0.82 – 0.95 
percent same-day change in the exchange rate. This is less than half of the magnitude suggested by the 
regressions using the Kuttner-decomposition and the isolated surprise component of the policy change. In 
other words, our findings illustrate that using the actual change as a measure of the impact of a monetary 
policy change will underestimate the importance of monetary policy (in the case of the GBP/USD 
exchange rate) or even wrongfully reject any effects of monetary policy (in the case of the DEM/USD and 
the JPY/USD exchange rates). 
Table 7 shows the coefficient estimate associated with the unexpected component of the Fed 
funds target rate changes for each of the first 15 GBP/USD exchange rate lead-models described in 
equation (3). These results mimic the results for the DEM/USD exchange rate as none of the GBP/USD 
lead models are associated with significant effects of the unexpected component of a monetary policy 
change. This complete absence of delayed effects implies that the GBP/USD exchange rate market 
absorbs news quickly. 
 
3.5 Macroeconomic News 
Consistent with Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Galati, Melick and Micu (2005) and others, we find 
evidence that surprises regarding macroeconomic news affect exchange rate fluctuations across all three 
exchange rates in our sample. However, since we are using an event study approach in order to focus on 
the impact of monetary policy changes (and not a time-series analysis), our regression models described 
by equations 1) and 2) only incorporate the announcement surprises on days coinciding with the 42 
monetary policy changes in our sample while our regression models described by equation 3) only 
incorporate the announcement surprises coinciding with the same 42 days leaded one day at a time (as k 
goes from 1 to 60). Therefore, our analysis, by construction, does not facilitate strong conclusions 
regarding the exchange rate responses associated with these announcement surprises. 
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3.6 Additional Robustness Checks 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also carry out the analysis using different exchange rate 
quotes time-stamps, redo the estimations on various sub-samples, and address issues pertaining to the 
possibility of asymmetric effects and slow absorption processes of the announcement surprises contained 
in the news control variables. 
First, as noted earlier, the announcement routine of the Fed has changed during the sample period 
and, therefore, no exchange rate quotes time-stamp is ideal for the entire period under study. We test the 
robustness of our baseline results (employing only noon Eastern exchange rate quotes) by redoing all the 
estimations using instead exchange rates recorded at 3 pm Eastern time (ideal for the target rate changes 
that occurred during the last part of the sample). In addition, we use a mix of exchange rate quotes 
(exchange rates recorded at noon Eastern time for the 24 target rate changes that occurred prior to 1994 
and exchange rates recorded at 3 pm Eastern time for the target rate changes that occurred after 1994). 
Our baseline results are not affected by using these alternative exchange rate quotes.12
Second, we redo the estimations using only US target rate change events that do not coincide with 
interest rate changes conducted by the relevant foreign central bank. This is done to ensure that the 
estimated exchange rate responses to US monetary policy surprises are not partly driven by simultaneous 
monetary policy changes carried out by foreign central banks. The results are identical to those based on 
the full sample. 13
                                                 
12 Another way of addressing the timing issue would be to split up the sample into two sub-samples, conduct the 
event study analysis on these sub-samples separately, and use exchange rates with a noon Eastern time-stamp for the 
1989-1994 sample and exchange rates with a 3 pm Eastern time-stamp for the second part of the sample. However, 
this is unappealing due to the relatively few events in the full sample (42 for the JPY/USD and GBP/USD exchange 
rates and 38 for the DEM/USD exchange rate).  
13 Fed funds target rate change events coinciding with changes in the German Discount and Lombard rates, the 
Japanese Discount Rate of Commercial Bills and the British Minimum Lending Rate and Repo Rate are excluded. 
This leads to exclusion of two events from the DEM/USD sample and one event from the GBP/USD sample. 
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Third, we redo the estimations using only events that do not coincide with intervention operations 
conducted (unilaterally as well as coordinated) by the Fed, the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan. 14 
Again, the results are unchanged. 
Fourth, we expand equation (1) to incorporate various dummies in order to test for asymmetric 
exchange rate responses to the unexpected component of a monetary policy change. In particular, we 
separate monetary tightening from monetary loosening. We find, however, no evidence of asymmetries.  
Fifth, in order to allow for the possibility of a slow absorption process in regards to other macro 
news announcements the lead-models are also estimated including all leads of the news control variables 
ranging from 1 to 60 (as opposed to the baseline approach where each lead model includes only the 
associated lead of the news control variables). This alteration has no impact on the delayed effect results. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We investigate whether exchange rates respond to only the surprise component of actual monetary policy 
changes and we assess the importance of isolating the surprise component from the actual news 
announcement. Furthermore, we investigate whether the exchange rate adjustment associated with 
monetary policy surprises is instantaneous or delayed. We focus our investigation on the 42 US monetary 
policy changes that occurred during the 1989 to 2000 time-period and we follow Kuttner (2001) in using 
Fed funds futures data in order to isolate the surprise component of each of these actual policy changes. In 
addition, we incorporate several control variables that capture the surprise element of US macroeconomic 
news and policy developments. 
Our main findings are the following: First, we show that the expected component of a monetary 
policy change has no impact on the exchange rate while the unexpected component of a tightening 
(loosening) of US monetary policy is associated with a same-day appreciation (depreciation) of the USD 
and, importantly, that failure to disentangle the surprise component from the actual monetary policy 
                                                 
14 This leads to exclusion of one event from the DEM/USD sample and one event from the JPY/USD sample. Due to 
unavailability of Bank of England intervention data, we are not able to control for intervention in the GBP/USD 
exchange rate. 
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change can lead to an underestimation of the impact of monetary policy or even to a false acceptance of 
the hypothesis that monetary policy has no impact on exchange rates. Second, we show that for all the 45 
displayed lead-models (15 leads estimated separately for each of the three exchange rates in our sample), 
no coefficient estimate associated with the surprise component of monetary policy changes appears 
significant at the 95% significance level or higher and only one instance of significance at the 90% level 
occurs. This absence of delayed effects strongly suggests that the exchange rates under study absorb 
monetary policy surprises within the same day as the news are announced. 
Comparing our findings to other studies, our findings appear at odds with two related and well-
known studies (neither of which focuses on expectations) of exchange rate responses to actual monetary 
policy innovations. Using three measures of monetary policy and a VAR approach for analyzing monthly 
data, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) find that initial USD appreciation in response to a US monetary 
contraction is small in comparison with subsequent USD appreciation and for the GBP/USD and the 
JPY/USD exchange rates the initial response is insignificant. Similarly, Lewis (1995) uses a VAR 
approach and biweekly data and finds no significant immediate reaction to (again, three measures of) 
monetary policy for either the DEM/USD or the JPY/USD exchange rate. As shown in section 3 of our 
study, it is necessary to disentangle the surprise component from the actual monetary policy change in 
order to avoid arriving at incorrect conclusions regarding exchange rate responses to monetary policy. It 
is indeed possible that both Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Lewis (1995) underestimate the initial 
impact of monetary policy due to their focus on actual monetary policy changes rather than on monetary 
policy surprises.  
Furthermore, our findings appear at odds with Evans and Lyons (2005). Investigating daily 
aggregates from an end-user microstructure data-set and employing VAR estimation techniques, they find 
that news such as monetary policy surprises induce changes in end-user trading and that these changes 
remain significant for several days. In other words, their findings imply that surprises matter but exchange 
rates do not absorb news instantaneously. Evans and Lyons (2005) suggest that a possible explanation for 
their finding of delayed effects is that in the case of non-financial corporations the “ultimate decision 
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makers” are not the people who are in charge of continuous monitoring of markets. Therefore, argues 
Evans and Lyons (2005), these corporations will not respond to news until the time of their, say, weekly 
“currency strategy meeting” when the ultimate decision makers are present. If this description of an 
important institutional aspect of decision making structures is accurate, it would indeed induce response 
lags to news. However, delayed responses to news are costly and the argument offered by Evans and 
Lyons (2005) does not explain why corporations with less frequent strategy meetings are not over time 
driven out of the market by corporations with more frequent strategy meetings.   
Our findings appear in line with Bonser-Neal, Roley and Sellon, Jr. (1998). They use an event 
study approach and the Fed funds target rate as a measure of monetary policy actions and show that 
exchange rates generally respond immediately to changes in US monetary policy. Their work, however, 
does not focus on expectations. As such, their findings may have some resemblance to ours when we 
analyze the GBP/USD exchange rate. Even without isolating the monetary policy surprise component we 
show that monetary policy changes are associated with same-day GBP/USD exchange rate changes. 
However, we also show that without disentangling the surprise from the actual change it is possible that 
the impact of a monetary policy change is underestimated. 
Despite our study being different due to, in particular, our use of separate measures of the surprise 
component, the expected component, and the news announcement itself and, furthermore, our use of a 
market based measure of expectations, our findings seem consistent with the high-frequency analysis by 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and the daily data analysis by Simpson, Ramchander and 
Chaudry (2005). Both of these papers focus on the exchange rate responses to only the surprise 
component of news and both use survey data for measuring expectations. In the context of a two-stage 
weighted least squares time-series analysis and, subsequently, an event study analysis, Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) show that exchange rates generally respond instantaneously 
(characterized by a jump immediately following the announcement and little movement thereafter) to 
news such as Fed fund target rate changes. Simpson, Ramchander and Chaudry (2005) use a VECM 
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framework and show that, in particular, a loosening of US monetary policy is associated with a same-day 
depreciation of the USD. 
 Two insights that follow from our work are that only the surprise component of an actual 
monetary policy change has an impact on exchange rates and that the associated exchange rate response 
occurs within the same day of the policy change. The most important insight, however, is that failure to 
disentangle the surprise component from the actual monetary policy change can lead to an 
underestimation of the impact of monetary policy or even to a false acceptance of the hypothesis that 
monetary policy has no impact on exchange rates. This has general implications for the empirical 
literature on asset price responses to macro news. It suggests that there is a need for reexamining the 
results from empirical analyses that do not isolate the unexpected component of news from the expected 
element. 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Max  Min  Non-Zero Observations 
Federal Funds Target Rate Change Unexpected (pct. points) 0.0757 0.1327 0.14 -0.36 42 
Federal Funds Target Rate Change Expected (pct. points) -0.0195 0.2296 0.61 -0.29 42 
Federal Funds Target Rate Change Actual (pct. points) -0.0952 0.3072 0.75 -0.50 42 
DEM/USD Daily Spot Rate 1.6372 0.1386 2.0295 1.356 2434 
GBP/USD Daily Spot Rate 0.6190 0.0435 0.7144 0.499 2989 
JPY/USD Daily Spot Rate 119.3039 16.1690 159.91 81.071 2989 
US CPI Unexpected  -0.0006 0.0246 0.3 -0.3 94 
US Industrial Production Unexpected  0.0013 0.0527 0.9 -0.7 121 
US PPI Unexpected -0.0028 0.0561 0.6 -0.8 120 
US Trade Balance Unexpected  -0.0111 0.3246 2.75 -3.8 141 
US Unemployment Rate Unexpected -0.0015 0.0311 0.4 -0.4 97 
Bundesbank Intervention (binary) 0.0514 0.2208 1 0 125 
Bundesbank Interest Rate (binary) 0.0070 0.0835 1 0 21 
Bank of England Interest Rate (binary) 0.0144 0.1191 1 0 43 
Bank of Japan Interest Rate (binary) 0.0054 0.0730 1 0 16 
Bank of Japan Intervention (binary) 0.0646 0.2458 1 0 193 
 
NOTES:   
 
a) All data series run from March 27, 1989 to February 2, 2002, with the exception of the DEM/USD exchange rate which ends on December 31, 
1998. All data are five days a week (Monday to Friday). 
b) Mean and std. dev. for the Federal Funds Target Rate variables are calculated using only non-zero observations. 
 
Data Sources:   
Federal Funds Target Rate Data: From Kuttner (2001). 
Exchange Rate Data: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Noon Eastern Time). 
Bundesbank, Bank of England and Bank of Japan Data: From official central bank sources. 
U.S. Macroeconomic Surprise Data: From Money Market Services and Bloomberg (the surprise is measures as the difference between actual 
announcement and median survey value). 
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TABLE 2        DEM/USD: Exchange Rate Responses to Changes in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 31 December 1998  
 Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B 
C -0.0007 
 (0.0014) 
-0.0005 
(0.00112) 
-0.0015 
(0.0014) 
-0.0015 
(0.0012) 
FFT-EXPECTED -0.0019 
(0.0061) 
-0.0016 
(0.0050) 
 
 
FFT-UNEXPECTED 0.0269*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0267*** 
(0.0087) 
 
 
FFT-ACTUAL   0.0076 
(0.0046) 
0.0061 
(0.0037) 
CPI-UNEXP -0.0223 
(0.0640)  
-0.0412 
(0.0673)  
IP-UNEXP 0.0061 
(0.0390)  
-0.0057 
(0.0410)  
PPI-UNEXP -0.0007 
(0.0222)  
-0.0127 
(0.0229)  
TRDE-UNEXP -0.0002 
(0.0043)  
0.0023 
(0.0044)  
UNEM-UNEXP 0.0327** 
(0.0159) 
0.0322** 
(0.0148) 
0.0218 
(0.0160)  
 
   
 
 
Observations 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.07 
S.E. of regression 0.0066 0.0063 0.0070 0.0068 
F-statistic  1.5246 3.8885** 0.8572 2.7106 
     
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equations (1) and (2) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily DEM/USD spot exchange rate.  
(e)    The independent variables FFT-EXPECTED and FFT-UNEXPECTED measure the expected and the unexpected element, 
respectively, of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. Both variables are taken from Kuttner (2001). The independent 
variable FFT-ACTUAL is the actual Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. 
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), 
Industrial Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP). 
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TABLE 3        DEM/USD: Summary of Same-Day and Delayed  Exchange Rate Responses to the 
                                            Unexpected Change in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 31 December 1998  
Each row below is associated with a separate regression model. Only the point estimate and the associated 
standard error for the independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED are shown, regardless of whether or not the 
control variables are significant. 
 
 FFT-UNEXPECTED R-squared F-statistic 
DLNDEM(0) 0.0267*** 
(0.0087) 
0.26 
 
3.8885** 
DLNDEM(1) -0.0040 
(0.0094) 
0.16 
 
0.9382 
DLNDEM(2) -0.0190 
(0.0112) 
0.12 
 
0.6902 
DLNDEM(3) -0.0024 
(0.0095) 
0.22 1.3385 
DLNDEM(4) -0.0052 
(0.0080) 
0.14 0.9297 
DLNDEM(5) -0.0090 
(0.0106) 
0.12 
 
0.6581 
DLNDEM(6) -0.0179 
(0.0108) 
0.30 
 
2.1190* 
DLNDEM(7) -0.0023 
(0.0093) 
0.12 
 
0.6273 
DLNDEM(8) -0.0019 
(0.0135) 
0.19 
 
0.8494 
DLNDEM(9) -0.0071 
(0.0151) 
0.20 
 
1.0569 
DLNDEM(10) -0.0147 
(0.0095) 
0.14 
 
1.4092 
DLNDEM(11) 0.0207 
(0.0157) 
0.27 
 
2.6181** 
DLNDEM(12) -0.0073 
(0.0110) 
0.10 
 
0.5304 
DLNDEM(13) -0.0124 
(0.0104) 
0.34 
 
1.8802 
DLNDEM(14) -0.0064 
(0.0085) 
0.38 
 
2.6277** 
DLNDEM(15) 0.0056 
(0.0116) 
0.09 
 
0.6330 
    
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equation (3) in the text.  
(d)    The dependent variable is lead one through fifteen of the first difference of the log of the daily DEM/USD spot exchange rate. 
(e)    The independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED measures the unexpected element of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC 
dates. This variable is taken from Kuttner (2001). 
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), Industrial 
Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP).  
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TABLE 4        JPY/USD: Exchange Rate Responses to Changes in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 4 April 2001  
 Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B 
C -0.0000 
 (0.0011) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
-0.0000 
(0.0009) 
FFT-EXPECTED 0.0001 
(0.0045) 
0.0014 
(0.0042) 
 
 
FFT-UNEXPECTED 0.0135 
(0.0084) 
0.0126* 
(0.0073) 
 
 
FFT-ACTUAL   0.0039 
(0.0033) 
0.0048 
(0.0029) 
CPI-UNEXP -0.0098 
(0.0553)  
-0.0178 
(0.0553)  
IP-UNEXP 0.0157 
(0.0141)  
-0.0167 
(0.0142)  
PPI-UNEXP -0.0367* 
(0.0192) 
-0.0389** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0422** 
(0.0188) 
-0.0430** 
(0.0182) 
TRDE-UNEXP -0.0004 
(0.0037)  
0.0007 
(0.0036)  
UNEM-UNEXP 0.0110 
(0.0137)  
0.0057 
(0.0131)  
 
   
 
 
Observations 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.19 
S.E. of regression 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 
F-statistic  1.7470 3.5780** 1.7569 4.6799** 
     
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equations (1) and (2) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily JPY/USD spot exchange rate.  
(e)    The independent variables FFT-EXPECTED and FFT-UNEXPECTED measure the expected and the unexpected element, 
respectively, of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. Both variables are taken from Kuttner (2001). The independent 
variable FFT-ACTUAL is the actual Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. 
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), 
Industrial Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP).   
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TABLE 5        JPY/USD: Summary of Same-Day and Delayed  Exchange Rate Responses to the 
                                            Unexpected Change in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 4 April 2001  
Each row below is associated with a separate regression model. Only the point estimate and the associated 
standard error for the independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED are shown, regardless of whether or not the 
control variables are significant. 
 
 FFT-UNEXPECTED R-squared F-statistic 
DLNJPY(0) 0.0126* 
(0.0073) 
0.22 
 
3.5780** 
DLNJPY(1) -0.0067 
(0.0093) 
0.33 
 
2.7783** 
DLNJPY(2) -0.0090 
(0.0095) 
0.13 
 
0.8254 
DLNJPY(3) -0.0051 
(0.0088) 
0.50 5.2350*** 
DLNJPY(4) -0.0008 
(0.0086) 
0.19 1.4382 
DLNJPY(5) -0.0091 
(0.0106) 
0.14 
 
0.8697 
DLNJPY(6) -0.0240 
(0.0149) 
0.14 
 
1.1494 
DLNJPY(7) -0.0097 
(0.0146) 
0.04 
 
0.1922 
DLNJPY(8) -0.0139 
(0.0093) 
0.36 
 
2.7182** 
DLNJPY(9) -0.0046 
(0.0083) 
0.04 
 
0.1676 
DLNJPY(10) -0.0016 
(0.0070) 
0.10 
 
0.6760 
DLNJPY(11) 0.0166 
(0.0105) 
0.28 
 
3.2169 
DLNJPY(12) 0.0093 
(0.0138) 
0.10 
 
0.5030 
DLNJPY(13) -0.0044 
(0.0123) 
0.20 
 
0.9787 
DLNJPY(14) -0.0285* 
(0.0137) 
0.17 
 
0.8130 
DLNJPY(15) 0.0073 
(0.0091) 
0.31 
 
3.0801 
    
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equation (3) in the text.  
(d)    The dependent variable is lead one through fifteen of the first difference of the log of the daily JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(e)    The independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED measures the unexpected element of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC 
dates. This variable is taken from Kuttner (2001).  
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), Industrial 
Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP).  
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TABLE 6        GBP/USD: Exchange Rate Responses to Changes in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 4 April 2001  
 Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B 
C -0.0007 
 (0.0011) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
-0.0014 
(0.0010) 
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 
FFT-EXPECTED 0.0045 
(0.0045) 
0.0046 
(0.0042) 
 
 
FFT-UNEXPECTED 0.0218** 
(0.0085) 
0.0200** 
(0.0076) 
 
 
FFT-ACTUAL   0.0095*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0082*** 
(0.0029) 
CPI-UNEXP -0.0365 
(0.0556)  
-0.0470 
(0.0564)  
IP-UNEXP 0.0017 
(0.0142)  
-0.0030 
(0.0145)  
PPI-UNEXP -0.0229 
(0.0193)  
-0.0158 
(0.0192)  
TRDE-UNEXP -0.0009 
(0.0037)  
0.0023 
(0.0037)  
UNEM-UNEXP 0.0257* 
(0.0138) 
0.0235* 
(0.0132) 
0.0188 
(0.0134)  
 
   
 
 
Observations 42 42 42 42 
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.16 
S.E. of regression 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 
F-statistic  1.9545 4.1793** 1.7831 7.8727*** 
     
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equations (1) and (2) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily GBP/USD spot exchange rate.  
(e)    The independent variables FFT-EXPECTED and FFT-UNEXPECTED measure the expected and the unexpected element, 
respectively, of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. Both variables are taken from Kuttner (2001). The independent 
variable FFT-ACTUAL is the actual Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC dates. 
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), 
Industrial Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
TABLE 7        GBP/USD: Summary of Same-Day and Delayed  Exchange Rate Responses to the 
                                            Unexpected Change in The Federal Funds Target Rate  
Daily Data: 27 March 1989 to 4 April 2001  
Each row below is associated with a separate regression model. Only the point estimate and the associated 
standard error for the independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED are shown, regardless of whether or not the 
control variables are significant. 
 
 FFT-UNEXPECTED R-squared F-statistic 
DLNGBP(0) 0.0200** 
(0.0076) 
0.25 
 
4.1793** 
DLNGBP(1) -0.0042 
(0.0074) 
0.07 
 
0.4017 
DLNGBP(2) -0.0119 
(0.0084) 
0.12 
 
0.7524 
DLNGBP(3) 0.0065 
(0.0083) 
0.20 1.3005 
DLNGBP(4) -0.0006 
(0.0080) 
0.09 0.6323 
DLNGBP(5) -0.0151 
(0.0096) 
0.18 
 
1.2038 
DLNGBP(6) -0.0096 
(0.0089) 
0.17 
 
1.7954 
DLNGBP(7) 0.0002 
(0.0098) 
0.19 
 
1.1565 
DLNGBP(8) -0.0086 
(0.0128) 
0.16 
 
0.7382 
DLNGBP(9) -0.0028 
(0.0098) 
0.13 
 
0.6897 
DLNGBP(10) -0.0115 
(0.0105) 
0.07 
 
0.4292 
DLNGBP(11) 0.0130 
(0.0133) 
0.28 
 
2.5368** 
DLNGBP(12) 0.0096 
(0.0083) 
0.11 
 
0.5472 
DLNGBP(13) -0.0076 
(0.0899) 
0.27 
 
1.4709 
DLNGBP(14) -0.0088 
(0.0084) 
0.39 
 
2.5909** 
DLNGBP(15) 0.0096 
(0.0094) 
0.13 
 
1.0894 
    
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)   Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equation (3) in the text.  
(d)    The dependent variable is lead one through fifteen of the first difference of the log of the daily GBP/USD spot exchange rate. 
(e)    The independent variable FFT-UNEXPECTED measures the unexpected element of the Federal Funds Target rate change on FOMC 
dates. This variable is taken from Kuttner (2001).  
(f)    The control variables measure the surprise element of US macroeconomic announcements concerning CPI (CPI-UNEXP), Industrial 
Production (IP-UNEXP), PPI (PPI-UNEXP), Balance of Trade (TRADE-UNEXP) and Unemployment (UNEM-UNEXP).  
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